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With the increasing number of threats involving organization's today, i.e., identity theft,
fraud, and embezzlement, it's imperative that companies have an incident response/forensic
policy in place in order to successfully retain and preserve potential evidence. Organizations
need to not only combat current problems, but to prevent them from reoccurring. Organizations
should not feel alone in this battle. The federal government alongwith state governments have
passed legislation thatmandates an incident response/forensic policy be implemented in order to
complywith the newly passed regulations, such has Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), Health Insurance
Portability and AccountabilityAct (HIPAA), and Gramm-Leach Bliley (GLBA). Also taken into
account are guidances, frameworks, and standards that are the building blocks that many
organizations have used to create their incident response/forensic policies and procedures. But
how do organizations know what to document in these policies? How do they know if their
policies complywith the ever growing number of regulations? How do they know that the
information they are retrieving is not considered personally identifiable information thatmay
have not been obtained legally? They do so by complying with the redundant, common criterion
that is found in these regulations, standards, frameworks, and guidances.
Before creating an incident response/forensic policy, organizations need to identify
privacy provisions as well as pertinent regulations, standards, frameworks, and guidances. After
the latter have been identified, the incident response/forensics requirements need to be identified
as well. Many organizations are now realizing the commonality/redundancies when reviewing
these regulations, standards, frameworks, and guidances. By identifying these requirements and
eliminating the redundancy, organizations can create and maintain a doctrine of documents that
ensure that they are in compliance. When new regulations, standards, frameworks, and/or
guidances are drafted and released, organizations are inconsistent when trying to complywith the
specified timelines instead of integrating them or identifying how they already fit with the
current environment.
Understanding the current computer incident state and federal laws is equally important,
but this expertise is expected of the legal department and law enforcement. Such laws include
The Compute Fraud and Abuse Act, The Computer SecurityAct of 1987, The US PrivacyAct of
1974, The Electronic Communication PrivacyAct of 1986, the Economic EspionageAct of
1996, The National Information Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996, USA PATRIOT Act of
2001, and the Homeland SecurityAct of2002. Only law enforcement, legal departments, and
state and federal district attorneys can determine whether or not the incident has the acceptable
amount of evidence to prosecute at the state or federal level. For the purposes of this paper, the
proceeding laws will not be analyzed.
This paper will give a high level overview of the regulations, standards, frameworks, and
guidances chosen for an incident response/forensics cross-mappingmatrix. In addition, once the
appropriate requirements have been identified, new common language requirements will be
created, and the identified regulations, standards, frameworks, and guidances will bemapped to
them. Once the mapping is complete, the requirements will be written as policy statements,
which will create a high level policy that is in compliance with the noted regulations, standards,
frameworks, and guidances.
Although redundant requirements will have been eliminated, there is still not a
standardize computer forensics/incidents handling policy, procedure or process for commercial
organizations. When trying to establish a standardized process, circumstances that need to be
taken into account are the size of the organization: people, resources, and budget. The latter are
the three biggest restraints for organizations to move forward with an incidentmanagement
program, so creating a standard will only force companies to either not have a process or have to
expend above and beyond the resources they have to offer.
Although there are many regulations, standards, frameworks, guidances, and
requirements mandated and implemented by organizations today, the following standards (ISO
17799:2005, FFIEC Information Security Handbook, Basel II), regulations (HIPAA, Privacy and
Security Rule, GLBA Privacy and Safeguard Rule, California Information Practice Act (CA SB
1386), NY State SecurityBreach and Notification Act (NY AB 4254), and Sarbanes-Oxley
(SOX) Section 301, 302, 404, 409, and 806), frameworks and guidances (Control Objectives for
Information and related Technology (COBIT), The Committee ofSponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission (COSO), The Information Security Forum (ISFMarch 2005), and
VISA/MC Payment Card Industry (PCI) requirements will be the focus for this research. All
requirements associated with the latterwill be listed and then common language will be extracted
to and mapped within a matrix.
The following paragraphs will give an overview of each regulation, standard, guidance,
framework, and requirements chosen for this paper. After the overview, each incident
response/forensic requirement will be documented and noted. After all the appropriate
requirements have been identified, the matrix and cross-mappingwith be created along with
policy statements and an over all high-level incident response/forensic policy.
Since ISO 17799:2005 and ISO 27001:2005 are not free documents, one will not find
much detail in regards to its content on the Internet, but its origin and background are easier to
come by. By definition, ISO 17799 is an internationally recognized Information Security
Management Standard that was published originally by ISO (International Organization for
Standardization; www.iso.ch) in Switzerland in 2000 (Hoffman, 2003). The origin of the
document though goes back further.
'In the mid-1990s, a group of companies in the U.K. combined to develop BS 7799 Part
1: Code ofPractice for Information SecurityManagement. The Specification for Information
SecurityManagement Systems (ISMS), which is BS 7799 Part 2, was published in February of
1998. When certification was established for BS 7799, The British Standards Institute pushed for
worldwide acceptance. In October 2005, BS 7799 Part 2 was renamed to ISO 27001:2005.
The International Standards Organization (ISO) agreed, along with the International
Electro-technical Commission (EEC) to 'fast
track'
it into an internationally accepted standard. In
December 2000, BS 7799 Part 1 was adopted as an international standard. Its official document
name is ISO / IEC 17799:2000. For the purposes of this document, the updated ISO 17799:2005
and ISO 27001:2005 versions were
used.'
(Hoffman, 2003).
ISO 17799 is very broad in scope and does not conform to any specific technology,
application, software, hardware, etc. Its broad scope allows the standard to be utilized across
many types oforganizations and enterprises. 'The goal of ISO 17799 is to protect the assets of a
corporation to ensure business continuity, minimize impact or damage to a business, and
maximize an organization's return on
investment.'
(Hoffman, 2003).
ISO/IEC 17799:2005 establishes guidelines and general principles for initiating,
implementing, maintaining, and improving information securitymanagement in an organization.
The objectives outlined provide general guidance on the commonly accepted goals of
information securitymanagement. ISO/IEC 17799:2005 contains best practices of control
objectives and controls in the following areas of information securitymanagement:
Security policy;
Organization of information security;
Assetmanagement;
Human resources security;
Physical and environmental security;
Communications and operations management;
Access control;
Information systems acquisition, development andmaintenance;
Information security incident management;
Business continuitymanagement;
Compliance
The original ISO 17799:2000 did not include Human resources security or Information systems
acquisition, development, and maintenance.
The specific incidentmanagement and forensics requirements stated in ISO 17799:2005
are the following:
5.1.1 Information securitypolicy document
Control
An information security policy document should be approved bymanagement, and published
and communicated to all employees and relevant external parties.
Implementation guidance
The information security policy document should state management commitment and set out the
organization's approach to managing information security. The policy document should contain
statements concerning:
e) A definition ofgeneral and specific responsibilities for information securitymanagement,
including reporting information security incidents; (BS ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 7, (2005))
5.1.2 Review ofthe information securitypolicy
Control
The information security policy should be reviewed at planned intervals or if significant changes
occur to ensure its continuing suitability, adequacy, and effectiveness.
Implementation guidance
The information security policy should have an owner who has approved management
responsibility for the development, review, and evaluation of the security policy. The review
should include assessing opportunities for improvement of the organization's information
security policy and approach to managing information security in response to changes to the
organizational environment, business circumstances, legal conditions, or technical environment.
(BS ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 8, (2005))
6. 1 Internal organization
Objective: To manage information securitywithin the organization.
Amanagement framework should be established to initiate and control the implementation of
information securitywithin the organization. Management should approve the information
security policy, assign security roles and co-ordinate and review the implementation of security
across the organization. Ifnecessary, a source of specialist information security advice should be
established and made available within the organization. Contacts with external security
specialists or groups, including relevant authorities, should be developed to keep up with
industrial trends, monitor standards and assessmentmethods and provide suitable liaison points
when handling information security incidents. A multi-disciplinary approach to information
security should be encouraged. (BS ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 9, (2005)).
6.1.2 Information security co-ordination
Control
Information security activities should be coordinated by representatives from different parts of
the organization with relevant roles and job functions.
Implementation guidance
Typically, information security co-ordination should involve the co-operation and collaboration
ofmanagers, users, administrators, application designers, auditors and security personnel, and
specialist skills in areas such as insurance, legal issues, human resources, IT or riskmanagement.
This activity should: evaluate information received from the monitoring and reviewing of
information security incidents, and recommend appropriate actions in response to identified
information security incidents. (BS ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 10, (2005)).
6.1.6 Contact with authorities
Control
Appropriate contacts with relevant authorities should bemaintained.
Implementation guidance
Organizations should have procedures in place that specifywhen and bywhom authorities (e.g.
law enforcement, fire department, supervisory authorities) should be contacted, and how
identified information security incidents should be reported in a timelymanner if it is suspected
that laws may have been broken.
Other information
Mamtaining such contacts may be a requirement to support information security incident
management (Section 13.2) or the business continuity and contingency planning process (Section
14). Contacts with regulatory bodies are also useful to anticipate and prepare for upcoming
changes in law or regulations, which have to be followed by the organization. Contacts with
other authorities include utilities, emergency services, and health and safety, e.g. fire
departments (in connectionwith business continuity), telecommunication providers (in
connectionwith line routing and availability), water suppliers (in connection with cooling
facilities for equipment). (BS ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 12, (2005)).
6.1. 7 Contact with special interest groups
Control
Appropriate contacts with special interest groups or other specialist security forums and
associations should be maintained.
Implementation guidance
Membership in special interest groups or forums should be considered as ameans to: provide
suitable liaison points when dealing with information security incidents (see also 13.2.1). (BS
ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 13, (2005)).
6.2.1 Identification ofrisks related to externalparties
Control
The risks to the organization's information and information processing facilities from business




Where there is a need to allow an external party access to the information processing facilities or
information of an organization, a risk assessment (see also Section 4) should be carried out to
identify any requirements for specific controls. The identification ofrisks related to external
party access should take into account the following issues: practices and procedures to deal with
information security incidents and potential damages, and the terms and conditions for the
continuation of external party access in the case of an information security incident; (BS
ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 14, (2005).
6.2.2Addressing security when dealing with customers
Control
All identified security requirements should be addressed before giving customers access to the
organization's information or assets.
Implementation guidance
The following terms should be considered to address security prior to giving customers access to
any of the organization's assets (depending on the type and extent of access given, not all of
them might apply): arrangements for reporting, notification, and investigation of information
inaccuracies (e.g. ofpersonal details), information security incidents and security breaches; (BS
ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 16, (2005)).
6.2.3 Addressing security in thirdparty agreements
Control
Agreements with third parties involving accessing, processing, communicating ormanaging the
organization's information or information processing facilities, or adding products or services to
information processing facilities should cover all relevant security requirements.
Implementation guidance
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The agreement should ensure that there is no misunderstanding between the organization and the
third party. Organizations should satisfy themselves as to the indemnity of the third party. The
following terms should be considered for inclusion in the agreement in order to satisfy the
identified security requirements (see 6.2.1): arrangements for reporting, notification, and
investigation of information security incidents and security breaches, as well as violations of the
requirements stated in the agreement; (BS ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 17, (2005)).
Other information
Some of the differences between outsourcing and the other forms of third party service provision
include the question of liability, planning the transition period and potential disruption of
operations during this period, contingency planning arrangements and due diligence reviews, and
collection and management of information on security incidents. Therefore, it is important that
the organization plans and manages the transition to an outsourced arrangement and has suitable
processes in place to manage changes and the renegotiation/termination of agreements. (BS
ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 18, (2005)).
8.2.1 Management responsibilities
Control
Management should require employees, contractors and third party users to apply security in
accordance with established policies and procedures of the organization.
Implementation guidance




If employees, contractors and third party users are not made aware of their security
responsibilities, they can cause considerable damage to an organization. Motivated personnel are
likely to be more reliable and cause less information security incidents. Training to enhance
awareness is intended to allow individuals to recognize information security problems and
incidents, and respond according to the needs of theirwork role. (BS ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 26,
(2005)).
10.2.2Monitoring and review ofthirdparty services
Control
The services, reports and records provided by the third party should be regularlymonitored and
reviewed, and audits should be carried out regularly.
Implementation guidance
Monitoring and review of third party services should ensure that the information security terms
and conditions of the agreements are being adhered to, and that information security incidents
and problems are managed properly. This should involve a service management relationship and
process between the organization and the third party to: provide information about information
security incidents and review of this information by the third party and the organization as
required by the agreements and any supporting guidelines and procedures;
The organization should maintain sufficient overall control and visibility into all security aspects
for sensitive or critical information or information processing facilities accessed, processed or
managed by a third party. The organization should ensure they retain visibility into security
activities such as change management, identification ofvulnerabilities, and information security
incident reporting/response through a clearly defined reporting process, format and structure. (BS
ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 40, (2005)).
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10.2.3Managing changes to thirdparty services
Control
Changes to the provision of services, includingmaintaining and improving existing information
security policies, procedures and controls, should be managed, taking account of the criticality of
business systems and processes involved and re-assessment ofrisks.
Implementation guidance
The process ofmanaging changes to a third party service needs to take account of: new controls




Agreements should be established for the exchange of information and software between the
organization and external parties.
Implementation guidance
Exchange agreements should consider the following security conditions: responsibilities and




Procedures for monitoring use of information processing facilities should be established and the
results of the monitoring activities reviewed regularly.
Implementation guidance
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The level ofmonitoring required for individual facilities should be determined by a risk
assessment. An organization should complywith all relevant legal requirements applicable to its
monitoring activities. Areas that should be considered include:
Other information
Usage monitoring procedures are necessary to ensure that users are only performing activities
that have been explicitly authorized. A log review involves understanding the threats faced by
the system and themanner inwhich thesemay arise. Examples of events thatmight require
further investigation in case of information security incidents are given in 13.1.1. (BS ISO/TEC
17799:2005,40,(2005)).
12.6.1 Control oftechnical vulnerabilities
Control
Timely information about technical vulnerabilities of information systems being used should be
obtained, the organization's exposure to such vulnerabilities evaluated, and appropriate measures
taken to address the associated risk.
Implementation guidance
A current and complete inventory of assets (see 7.1) is a prerequisite for effective technical
vulnerabilitymanagement. Specific information needed to support technical vulnerability
management includes the software vendor, version numbers, current state of deployment (e.g.
what software is installed on what systems), and the person(s) within the organization
responsible for the software. Appropriate, timely action should be taken in response to the
identification ofpotential technical vulnerabilities. The following guidance should be followed to
establish an effective management process for technical vulnerabilities:
e) Depending on how urgently a technical vulnerability needs to be addressed, the action
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taken should be carried out according to the controls related to change management (see
12.5.1) or by following information security incident response procedures (see 13.2); (BS
ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 88, (2005)).
13.1.1 Reporting information security events
Control
Information security events should be reported through appropriate management channels as
quickly as possible.
Implementation guidance
A formal information security event reporting procedure should be established, together with an
incident response and escalation procedure, setting out the action to be taken on receipt ofa
report of an information security event. A point of contact should be established for the reporting
of information security events. It should be ensured that this point of contact is known
throughout the organization, is always available and is able to provide adequate and timely
response. All employees, contractors and third party users should be made aware of their
responsibility to report any information security events as quickly as possible. They should also
be aware of the procedure for reporting information security events and the point of contact. The
reporting procedures should include:
a) Suitable feedback processes to ensure that those reporting information security events are
notified of results after the issue has been dealt with and closed;
b) Information security event reporting forms to support the reporting action, and to help the
person reporting to remember all necessary actions in case of an information security
event;
c) The correct behavior to be undertaken in case of an information security event, i.e.
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1) Noting all important details (e.g. type ofnon-compliance or breach, occurring
malfunction, messages on the screen, strange behavior) immediately;
2) Not carrying out any own action, but immediately reporting to the point ofcontact;
d) Reference to an established formal disciplinary process for dealingwith employees,
contractors or third party users who commit security breaches.
In high-risk environments, a duress alarm4may be providedwhereby a person under duress can
indicate such problems. The procedures for responding to duress alarms should reflect the high
risk situation such alarms are
indicating."
(BS ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 88, 90, (2005)).
13.1.2 Reporting security weaknesses
Control
All employees, contractors and third party users of information systems and services should be
required to note and report any observed or suspected securityweaknesses in systems or
services.
Implementation guidance
All employees, contractors and third party users should report these matters either to their
management or directly to their service provider as quickly as possible in order to prevent
information security incidents. The reportingmechanism should be as easy, accessible, and
available as possible. They should be informed that they should not, in any circumstances,
attempt to prove a suspected weakness. (BS ISO/IEC 17799:2005, 91, (2005)).
13.2.1 Responsibilities andprocedures
Control
Management responsibilities and procedures should be established to ensure a quick, effective,
and orderly response to information security incidents.
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Implementation guidance
In addition to reporting of information security events and weaknesses (see also 13.1), the
monitoring of systems, alerts, and vulnerabilities (10.10.2) should be used to detect information
security incidents. The following guidelines for information security incidentmanagement
procedures should be considered: a) procedures should be established to handle different types of
information security incident,
including:
1) Information system failures and loss of service;
2) Malicious code (see 10.4.1);
3) Denial of service;
4) Errors resulting from incomplete or inaccurate business data;
5) Breaches of confidentiality and integrity;
6) misuse of information systems;
In addition to normal contingency plans (see 14.1.3), the procedures should also cover
(see also 13.2.2):
1) Analysis and identification of the cause of the incident; 4) communication with those affected
by or involved with recovery from the incident;
The objectives for information security incident management should be agreed with
management, and it should be ensured that those responsible for information security incident
management understand the organization's priorities for handling information security incidents.
(BS ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 92, (2005)).
Other information
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Information security incidents might transcend organizational and national boundaries. To
respond to such incidents there is an increasing need to coordinate response and share
information about these incidents with external organizations as appropriate. (BS ISO/TEC
17799:2005, 93, (2005)).
13.2.2 Learningfrom information security incidents
Control
There should be mechanisms in place to enable the types, volumes, and costs of information
security incidents to be quantified and monitored.
Implementation guidance
The information gained from the evaluation of information security incidents should be used to
identify recurring or high impact incidents.
Other Information
The evaluation of information security incidents may indicate the need for enhanced or
additional controls to limit the frequency, damage, and cost of future occurrences, or to be taken




"Where a follow-up action against a person or organization after an information security incident
involves legal action (either civil or criminal), evidence should be collected, retained, and
presented to conform to the rules for evidence laid down in the relevant jurisdiction(s).
Implementation guidance
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Internal procedures should be developed and followed when collecting and presenting evidence
for the purposes ofdisciplinary action handled within an organization.
Any forensics work should only be performed on copies of the evidential material. The integrity
of all evidential material should be protected. Copying of evidential material should be
supervised by trustworthy personnel and information onwhen and where the copying process
was executed, who performed the copying activities and which tools and programs have been
utilized should be
logged."
(BS ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 94, (2005)).
14.1.1 Including information security in the business continuity managementprocess
Control
A managed process should be developed andmaintained for business continuity throughout the
organization that addresses the information security requirements needed for the organization's
business continuity.
Implementation guidance
The process should bring together the following key elements ofbusiness continuity
management: understanding the impact which interruptions caused by information security
incidents are likely to have on the business (it is important that solutions are found that will
handle incidents causing smaller impact, as well as serious incidents that could threaten the
viability of the organization), and establishing the business objectives of information processing




A single framework ofbusiness continuity plans should bemaintained to ensure all plans are
consistent, to consistently address information security requirements, and to identify priorities
for testing andmaintenance.
Implementation guidance
Each business continuity plan should describe the approach for continuity, for example the
approach to ensure information or information system availability and security. Each plan should
also specify the escalation plan and the conditions for its activation, as well as the individuals
responsible for executing each component of the plan. When new requirements are identified,
any existing emergency procedures, e.g. evacuation plans or fallback arrangements, should be
amended as appropriate. Procedures should be included within the organization's change
management program to ensure that business continuitymatters are always addressed
appropriately. A business continuity planning framework should address the identified
information security requirements and consider the following: emergency procedures, which
describe the actions to be taken following an incident, which jeopardizes business operations;
(BS ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 97, (2005)).
14.1.5 Testing, maintaining and re-assessing business continuityplans
Control
Business continuity plans should be tested and updated regularly to ensure that they are up to
date and effective.
Implementation guidance
Business continuity plan tests should ensure that all members of the recovery team and other
relevant staff are aware of the plans and their responsibility for business continuity and
information security and know their role when a plan is invoked. The test schedule for business
21
continuity plan(s) should indicate how and when each element of the plan should be tested. Each
element of the plan(s) should be tested frequently. A variety of techniques should be used in
order to provide assurance that the plan(s) will operate in real life. These should include:
simulations (particularly for training people in their post-incident/crisis management roles); (BS
ISO/TEC 17799:2005, 98, (2005)).
As noted above, the ISO 17799:2005 requirements for incidentmanagement and response
and forensics transcend the organization's information security policy and posture, which include
training, business continuity, third party agreements, contacts, management's involvement and
support, and reporting. Requirements do not simply fall under and incident response and
forensic categories, furthering the need for a policy thatmaps directly to regulations, standards,
and frameworks.
The next standard used for research is The Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council (FFIEC). 'The FFIEC is an organization established by Congress in 1987 to coordinate
and unify regulations, standards, and report forms among the five member federal agencies that
regulate savings institutions, commercial banks, and credit unions: Office ofThrift Supervision
(OTS), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Board ofGovernors of the Federal
Reserve System (FRB), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), andNational Credit
UnionAdministration (NCUA). The work of the council is carried out by five task forces, made
up of representatives of each agency, dealing with: education and training, supervision, reports,
consumer compliance, and surveillance. For the purposes of this paper, the focus will be on the
FFIEC Information Security (IS) Examination Handbook. Overall, there are twelve handbooks.





The FFIEC IS Handbook is divided into seven sections; Introduction, Security Process,
Information Security Risk Assessment, Information Security Strategy, Security Controls,
Implementation, Security Testing, andMonitoring and Updating, accompanied by three
appendices; Appendix A: Examination Procedures, Appendix B: Glossary, and Appendix C:
Laws, Regulations, and Guidance. The specific incidentmanagement and forensics requirements
stated in the FFIEC Information Security Examination Handbook are the following sections:
"Security Controls Implementation (Logical and Administrative Control):
Security personnel and network administrators have related but distinct responsibilities
for ensuring secure network access across a diverse deployment of interconnecting network
servers, file servers, routers, gateways, and local and remote client workstations.
Security personnel typically lead or assist in the development ofpolicies, standards, and
procedures, andmonitor compliance. They also lead or assist in incident-response efforts.




"Physical Security (Data Center Security):
Detection devices, where applicable, should be utilized to prevent theft and safeguard the
equipment. They should provide continuous coverage. Detection devices have two purposes to
alarm when a response is necessary and to support subsequent forensics. The alarm capability is
only useful when a response will
occur."
((FFIEC), 45, (2002)).
"Logging and Data Protection:
Financial institutions should take reasonable steps to ensure that sufficient data is collected from
secure log files to identify and respond to security incidents and to monitor and enforce policy
compliance."
((FFIEC), 64, (2002)). "Many products such as firewall and intrusion detection
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software can simplify the securitymonitoring by automating the analysis of the logs and alerting
the appropriate personnel of suspicious activity. Log files are critical to the successful
investigation and prosecution of security incidents and can potentially contain sensitive
information."
((FFIEC), 65, (2002)).
"The financial institution should have an effective means of tracing a security event
through their system. Synchronized time stamps on network devices may be necessary to
gather consistent logs and a consistent audit trail. Additionally, logs should be available,




Financial institutions should exercise their security responsibilities for outsourced operations
through Coordination of incident response policies and contractual notification
requirements."
((FFIEC), 66, (2002)).
"Financial institutions should determine the following security considerations when selecting or
monitoring a service provider: Clear understanding of the provider's security incidence response
policy and assurance that the provider will communicate security incidents promptly to the
institution when its systems or datawere potentially
compromised."
((FFIEC), 67, (2002)).
"Intrusion Detection and Response (Intrusion Response):
Successful implementation of any response policy and procedure requires the assignment
of responsibilities and training. Some organizations formalize the response organization
with the creation of a computer security incident response team (CSIRT). The CSIRT is
typically taskedwith performing, coordinating, and supporting responses to security incidents.
Due to the wide range ofnon-technical issues that are posed by an intrusion, typical CSIRT
membership includes individuals with a wide range ofbackgrounds and expertise, frommany
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different areas within the institution. Those areas include management, legal, public relations, as
well as information technology. Other organizations may outsource some of the CSIRT




Insurance coverage is increasingly available to cover risks from security breaches or denial of
service attacks. For example, several insurance companies offer e-commerce insurance packages
that can reimburse financial institutions for losses from fraud, privacy breaches, system
downtime, or incident response. Insurance coverage is rapidly evolving to meet the growing
number of security-related threats. Coverage varies by insurance company, but currently
available insurance products may include coverage for the following risks: Incident response
costs related to the use ofnegotiators, public relations consultants, security and computer
forensic consultants, programmers, replacement systems,
etc'
((FFEEC), 76, (2002)). 'For
example, financial institutions should understand the extent of coverage available in the event of
security breaches at a third-party service provider. In such a case, the institutionmaywant to




"Appendix A (QualityRisk Management Objective 5: Evaluate the security-related controls
embedded in vendormanagement):
Evaluate the adequacy of incident response policies and contractual notification
requirements in light of the risk of the outsourced
activity."
((FFIEC), A-5, (2002)).
"Appendix A (Objective 7: Evaluate the effectiveness of enterprise-wide security
administration):




"Appendix A (Examination Procedures- Network Security):
Determine whether logs of security-related events are sufficient to affix accountability
for network activities, as well as support intrusion forensics and IDS. Additionally, determine
that adequate clock synchronization takes
place."
((FFIEC), A-13, (2002)).
"Appendix A (Examination Procedures-Host Security):
Determine whether logs are sufficient to affix accountability for host activities and to support




"Appendix A (Personnel Security):
Determine if employees have an available and reliable mechanism to promptly report security
incidents, weaknesses, and software
malfunctions."
((FFIEC), A-16, (2002)).
"Appendix A (Examination Procedures- Application Security):




"Appendix A (Examination Procedures- Intrusion Detection and Response):
Determine whether logs of security-related events are sufficient to assign accountability
for intrusion detection system activities, as well as support intrusion forensics and IDS.
((FFIEC), A-18, (2002)). Determine whether an incident response team: contains appropriate
membership, is available at all times, has appropriate fraining to investigate and report findings,
has access to back-up data and systems, an inventory of all approved hardware and software, and
monitored access to systems (as appropriate), and has appropriate authority and timely access to
decision makers for actions that require higher approvals. ((FFIEC), A-19, (2002)).
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"Appendix A (Service Provider Oversight Security):




Again, as with the ISO 17799:2005 standard, the FFIEC's incidentmanagement and
response and forensics requirements transcend into security controls, physical security,
third-
party access and contractors, personnel security, and logical access. In addition, the FFIEC also
contains an insurance section, which was not noted in the ISO 17799:2005 standard.
The last standard is Basel II, which in some eyes, is considered a framework. 'The
leading international financial standards-setting institution, the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision has created important new standards for electronic banking. In a report entitled
'Risk Management for Electronic
Banking,'
the Basel Committee set fourth riskmanagement
principles to help banking institutions expand their existing risk oversight policies and processes
to cover electronic banking. These RiskManagement Principles call for banks to establish




'In order to implement the RiskManagement Principle (Principle 14), the Basel
Committee highlighted eight actions that should be undertaken by banks, including four specific
incident response and forensic functions or capabilities that banks should develop:
Incident response plans to address recovery of e-banking systems and services under
various scenarios, business and geographic locations
Mechanisms to identify a crisis as soon as it occurs, access its materiality, and controls
the reputation risk associatedwith any services
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Incident response teams with the authority to act in an emergency and sufficiently
trained
to analyzing incident detection/response systems and interpreting the significance of
related output.
A process for collecting and preserving forensic evidence to facilitate appropriate post
mortem reviews of any e-banking incidents as well to assist in the prosecuting of
attackers'. (Patzakis, J. 2003).
Now that the above standards have been parsed, and incident and forensic requirements
have been identified, the following paragraphs will cover federal regulations. These regulations
include The Health Insurance Portability and AccountabilityAct (HIPAA) of 1996, Gramm-
Leach-BlileyAct of 1999 (GLBA), California State Bill 1386 (CA SB 1386), New York State
Information Security Breach and Notification Act (NY AB 4254), and Sarbanes-OxleyAct of
2002 (SOX). These regulatory acts have specific requirements to ensure the protection and
privacy of individual's personal data as well as mandate incident response and forensics policies
and procedures.
The Health Insurance Portability and AccountabilityAct of 1996 (HIPAA) was passed to
ensure that individual personal health care information was not being disclosed to unauthorized
individuals. HIPAA includes two rules, the Privacy and Security Rule. The Security Rule is
broken down into Administrative, Physical, and Technical Safeguards that include and require
incident management and response and forensics. Each requirement within each safeguard is
either required or addressable. If the requirement is required, then it is mandatory that their
implementation be carried out. If the requirement is addressable, it does not mean that it is not
required, only that it needs to be implementedwhen necessary and reasonable. Administrative
safeguards make up fifty percent of the Security Rule's standard. In general, they require
28
documented policies and procedures for day to day operations; managing the conduct of
employees with protected health information (PHI); andmanaging the selection, development,
and use of security controls. The specific administrative standards that pertain to incident
management and response and forensics:
'Section 164.308 (1) (i) Securitymanagement process: Implementing policies and procedures
to prevent, detect, contain, and correct security violations
Section 164.308(5) (ii) Security incident procedures: Implementing policies and procedures
to handle security
incidents.'
(SANS 2003, page 7).
'Under the SecurityManagement process there are four required requirements, one ofwhich
involves IncidentManagement; Information System Activity Review. This requirement states
that security incident reports are used to assess if security controls are appropriate or need to be
improved for organizational effectiveness. Under the Security Incident Procedures there is one
requirement that is also required; Response and Reporting. This requirement states that
organization's policies and procedures must identify the actions to takewhen a security incident
is discovered, the outcome of your actions, and the impact on the information you are protecting.
Thismeans ifyou, an unauthorized person, gained access to electronic protected health
information (ePHI), what actions did you take to revoke the access, access that the information is




Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as The FinancialModernizationAct of
1999, includes provision to protect
consumers'
personal financial information by financial
institutions. Like with HIPAA, GLBA not only contains a Privacy Rule, but a Safeguards Rule
as well, (http://www.ftc.gov/privacv/privacvinitiatives/glbact.html).
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The Safeguards Rule requires financial institutions to have a security plan established and
in place to protect the confidentiality and integrity of individual's personal consumer
information, (http://www.ftc.gov/privacv/privacyinitiatives/safeguards.html).
Similar to HIPAA, GLBA breaks down its requirements into three distinct
categories/safeguards for securing personal or personally identifiable information: Employee
Management and Training, Information Systems, andManaging System Failures.
Themain incident response/forensic procedure requirement within GLBA falls under the
Employee Management and Training safeguard:
1 . Recognizing any fraudulent attempt to obtain customer information and reporting it to the
appropriate law enforcement agencies.
(http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/safeguards.htm).
Additional requirement do fall under the Information Systems Safeguard as well:
1. Store paper records in a room, cabinet, or other container that is locked when unattended;
2. Ensure that storage areas are protected against destruction or potential damage from
physical hazards, like fire or floods;
3. Store electronic customer information on a secure server that is accessible onlywith a
password - or has other security protections
- and is kept in a physically-secure area;
4. Don't store sensitive customer data on amachine with an Internet connection; and
5. Maintain secure backup media and keep archived data secure, for example, by storing off
line or in a physically-secure area.
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6. Dispose ofcustomer information in a secure manner. For example:
a. Hire or designate a records retentionmanager to supervise the disposal of records
containing nonpublic personal information;
b. Shred customer information recorded on paper;
c. Erase all data when disposing of computers, diskettes, magnetic tapes, hard drives or
any other electronic media that contain customer information;
d. Effectively destroy the hardware; and
e. Promptly dispose ofoutdated customer information.
(http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/buspubs/safeguards.htm).
Last, are theManaging System Failures safeguards, which include the following relevant
requirements:
1 . Maintain up-to-date and appropriate programs and controls by:
a. Following a written contingency plan to address any breaches of your physical,
administrative or technical safeguards;
b. Checking with software vendors regularly to obtain and install patches that resolve
software vulnerabilities;
c. Using anti-virus software that updates automatically;
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d. Maintaining up-to-date firewalls, particularly if you use broadband Internet access or allow
employees to connect to your network from home or other off-site locations; and
e. Providing central management of security tools for your employees and passing along
updates about any security risks or breaches.
(http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs^spubs/safeguards.htm).
The next piece of legislation relevant to an incident response/forensic policy is
California's State Bill number 1386 (CA SB 1386). 'CA SB 1386 obligates companies to
electronically store any encrypted personal information of any California resident and to notify
such persons of a security breach to the database storing their data. The statute was created to
address one of the fastest growing crimes committed in California-identity theft, but it has far
broader legal implications. Specifically, SB 1386, codified as Civil CodeA 1798.82, etseq.,
requires 'any person or business that conducts business in California, and that owns or licenses
computerized data that includes personal information, [to] disclose any breach of the security
system to any resident ofCaliforniawhose unencrypted personal information was, or is
reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person'. The statute imposes
specific notification requirements on companies in such circumstances. The statute applies
regardless ofwhether the computerized consumer records are maintained in or outside
California. As long as a company conducts business in California and owns or licenses
computerized data that includes "personal
information"
(defined below) about residents, it has a
legal obligation to notify its California consumers of security breaches to their personal
information. The statute thus has broad implications for companies across the United States, and
worldwide, if theymaintain, own, or license unencrypted computer data containing personal
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information about California residents. The statute defines "personal
information"
as an
individual's first name or first initial and last name in combination with any one ormore of the
following, when either the name or data elements are not encrypted: (a) Social Security number;
(b) driver's license number or California ID card number; (c) account number, credit or debit
card number, in combination with any required security code, access code, or password that
would permit access to an individual's financial account. "Personal
information"
does not include
publicly available information that is lawfullymade available to the general public from federal,
state, or local government
records.'
('Technology', 2003). Again, amajority of the provisions
included in CA SB 1386 are also addressed in the VISA CISP (PCI requirements), which will be
defined later in the paper. For the purposes of an incident response/forensics policy, it will be
crucial to identify such personal information and determine, what, if any, was compromised
during the breach. In addition, the policymust define and determine what the procedures are to
recover any compromised encrypted data as well. The statute broadly defines a security breach
as an unauthorized acquisition of computerized data that compromises the security,
confidentiality, or integrity ofpersonal information maintained by the person or business. The
statute does not define the term unauthorized or specifywhat evidence of a breach is necessary to
trigger notification obligations. The statute also leaves unresolved whether companies have an
affirmative duty to activelymonitor and detect security breaches. In order to gain compliance
under this bill, organizations need to implement the following:
1 . 'Develop and implementmeasures for detecting and reporting incidents ofunauthorized
access to personal information. Make sure you retain relevant records and test, maintain
and audit the effectiveness of access controls and securitymeasures'. ('Technology',
2003).
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2. 'Develop and implement procedures for rapid assessment of suspected security breaches,
referral of suspected criminal acts to law enforcement agencies, notification of affected
California residents and for appropriate public announcements to stakeholders and other




California is not the only state that has passed such legislation. New York State has its own
version of the CA SB 1386 as well. Its name is The Information Security Breach and
Notification Act (NY AB 4254).
"The Information Security Breach and Notification Act (NY AB 4254) requires entities
that conduct business inNew York State and own or license
'private'
data to notify state
residents affected by any security breach that results in unauthorized acquisition of that data.
'Private'
data is defined as unencrypted computerized information that can identify the
individual, combined with one of the following data elements: 1) social security number, 2)
driver's license or non-driver identification card number, or 3) financial account information
such as credit or debit card numbers in combination with access codes or PIN numbers. Private
data is considered to be unencrypted when either the identifying information or the data element
is not encrypted or is encrypted with a key that has also been acquired. Notificationmust be
provided directly to the affected persons by a) written notice, b) electronic form, c) telephone
notice, or d) under certain conditions, e-mail notice, conspicuous posting of the notice on the
website of the affected business, and notification to major statewide media. In addition, persons
or businesses thatmaintain, but do not own private data, are obligated to notify the entity that
owns or licenses the datawhen a security breach results in unauthorized access. Under the Act,
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the data owner or licenseemost likely remains responsible for notifying the individuals affected
by the security breach. In light of these legislative developments, entities that conduct business
in New York Statemust be particularly vigilant to ensure that privacy date is secure. At a
minimum, a person or business that possesses private should: 1) implement procedures to
monitor the review database and other computerized information storage devices to identify
where private data is stored; and 2) establish clear and effective notification procedures to
responds to actual breaches of security. The specific requirement that needs to be added to an
organization's incident response/forensic policy is that notification procedures are defined and
that personal information is defined as
well.'
('New York', 2005)
The last regulation analyzed is the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of2002. This act, or
certain sections of this act, has cost publicly traded organizations time, resources, and their
sanity. Sarbanes-Oxleywas created and passed due to the lack of internal controls that caused
inflated profits and the loss of
employees'
retirements. The following sections contain incident
response and forensic requirements:
Section 404 requires companies to institute effective 'internal controls that provide
assurance regarding prevention or timely detection ofunauthorized acquisition, use or
disposition of the company's assets that could have a material effect on financial
documentation.'
(Limongelli and Patzakis, 2004).
Section 302 requires CEOs and CFOs to evaluate the company's 'internal controls and
their effectiveness, noting, when assessing a company's internal control structure, management
must analyze those controls related to the prevention, identification, and detection of fraud. (68
FR 36636, 36643) (Limongelli and Patzakis, 2004).
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Section 301 states that 'The Audit Committee must 'establish procedures for (a) the
receipt, retention, and treatment of complaints regarding accounting, internal accounting
controls, anonymous submission by employees of concerns regarding questionable accounting
auditingmatters. Failure to investigate whistleblower complaints, quickly and competently
would suggest a lack of internal controls under Section 404 and 302. Companies must provide
basis for any assessment and rejection of claims. Failure to follow Section 301 ofSarbanes-
Oxley subjects a company to being
de-listed.'
(68 FR 64154). (Limongelli and Patzakis, 2004).
Section 806 ofSOX provides a 'civil cause of action for any employee who is retaliated
against for whistle blowing if employee 'reasonably
believes'
fraud is occurring. Section 1 107 of
SOX creates federal crime for retaliating against whistleblowers that provide assistance to law
enforcement.'
(Limongelli and Patzakis, 2004).
'Section 409 ofSarbanes-Oxley; each reporting companymust communicate timely
information to the public. Delayed investigationmay prevent timely response, and delays may
result in lost evidence or opportunities. Section 802 ofSarbanes-Oxley institutes severe criminal
penalties for destruction of
evidence.'
(Limongelli and Patzakis, 2004).
The following table summarized the overall requirements/per section for the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act:
Sarbanes-Oxley Overall requirements Per Section
Effective Internal Investigations 302, 404, and 806
Evidence ofDue Diligence 301, 302, and 404
Rapid Response: Expedient, efficient, and 302, 404, and 409
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thorough
Deleted Document Recovery 802
Document Preservation/Retention 802
Again, it is important to remember the following with standards, regulations, and
frameworks: Standards tell you somewhat how to complywith their set of requirements, but
don't give a standard reporting ormetrics to follow or gauge what level of compliance
companies are at. Regulations on the other hand, give you no guidance as to how to comply,
onlymandate that companies do within a certain time frame. Frameworks and guidances give
examples ofhow to build and/or organize polices, procedures, and standards in order to comply
with standards and regulations.
The next section ofresearch will cover the frameworks and guidances. The entities
covered include the Standard ofGood Practice for Information Security (ISF), Control
Objectives for Information and related Technology (COBIT), and The Committee ofSponsoring
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO).
The Standard ofGood Practice for Information Security (ISF v4) is an independent
authority on information security that provides practical guidance and solution to overcome the
wide-ranging security challenges impacting business information today. Again, this standard of
good practice is not required by public or private organizations, rather it acts as a step by step
guide ofwhat these organizations need to accomplish in order to create and maintain a successful
incident response/forensics program. The ISF is broken down into five categories: security
management, critical business applications, computer installations, networks, and systems
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development. The following key requirements have beenmarked as essential for the incident
response/forensic policy and process:
'Area SM 5 Malicious Attack
Organizations are often subject to malicious attacks from third parties, for example by viruses of
hacking. Consequently, this area covers the security controls required to protect against viruses
and other malicious code, provide intrusion detection capabilities, respond to a serious attack,
and to manage forensic investigations. The following principles and objectives fall under the
requirements needed for incident response and forensic investigations:
Section SM 5.5 Forensic Investigations
Principle: A process should be established for dealing with incidents that require forensic
investigations.
Objective: To identify perpetrators ofmalicious acts and preserve sufficient evidence to
prosecute them if
required.'
((ISF IS), 7, (2005)).
'Area CB 2 Application Management
Keeping business risks within acceptable limits requires a coherent set of Information security
arrangements. Accordingly, this area covers the roles and responsibilities required (including
'business ownership'), integral application controls, and additional controls for handling
sensitive material for transferring sensitive information. In addition, this area covers general
management controls including change management, incident management, and business
continuity.
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Section CB 2.4 Incidentmanagement
Principle: All incidents of any type should re recorded, reviewed, and resolved using an incident
management process.
Objective: To identify and resolve incidents effectively, minimize their business impact and
reduce the risk of similar incidents
occurring.'
((ISF IS), 12, (2005)).
'Area CI 2 Live Environment
Section CI 2.2 Event logging
Principle: Logs of all key events within the computer installation should be maintained
(preferably using automated tools), reviewed periodically and protected against unauthorized
change.
Objective: To ensure individual accountability and to enable incidents such as access violation,
to be investigated and
resolved.'
((ISF IS), 18, (2005)).
'Area CI 3 System Operation
Achieving service targets requires computer installations to be run in accordance with sound
disciplines. Accordingly this area covers basic controls over system operations (i.e. handling
computermedia, back-up, and changemanagement) and arrangements for identifying and
resolving incidents (i.e. incident management and emergency fixes).
Section CI 3.4 Incident management
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Principle: All incidents of any type should be recorded, reviewed, and resolved using an incident
management process.
Objective: To identify and resolve incidents effectively, minimize their business impact and
reduce the risk of similar incident s
occurring.'
((ISF IS), 20, (2005)).
'AreaNW 3 Network Operations
Maintaining continuity of service to users requires computer networks to be run in accordance
with sound disciplines. Accordingly this area covers the arrangements needed to monitor
network performance and to manage change and incidents. In addition, the area covers the
arrangements required to provide physical security, take back-ups, and ensure service continuity.
Section NW 3.3 Incident management
Principle: All network incidents of any type should be recorded, reviewed, and resolved using
an incident management process.
Objective: To identify and resolve network incidents effectively, minimize their business impact,
and reduce the risk of similar incidents
occurring.'
((ISF IS), 26, (2005)).
'Section SM 2.2 Information security function
Principle: A specialist information security function should be established, which has enterprise-
wide responsibility for promoting information security.
Objective: To ensure good practice in information security is applied effectively throughout the
enterprise.
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SM 2.2.2 The information security function should:
e) Investigate major information security
incidents.'
((ISF IS), SM 2.2, (2005)).
'Section SM 2.4 Security Awareness
Principle: Specific activities should be undertaken, such as a security awareness program, to
promote security awareness to all individuals who have access to the information and systems of
the enterprise.
Objective: To ensure all relevant individuals understand the key elements of information
security and why it is needed, and understand their personal information security responsibilities.
SM 2.4.1 Specific activities should be performed to promote security awareness (the extent to
which staffunderstand the importance of information security, the level of security required by
the organization and their individual security responsibilities ad act accordingly) across the
enterprise. These activities should be:
h) Aimed at reducing the frequency and magnitude of
incidents'
((ISF IS), SM 2.4 (2005)).
'SM 2.4.4 The effectiveness of security awareness should be monitored bymeasuring:
b) The effectiveness of security awareness activities, for example bymonitoring the frequency
and magnitude of incidents
experienced.'
((ISF IS), SM 2.4, (2005)).
'SM 3.3.5 Once risks have been identified, information risk analysis methods should help
organization to:
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a) Select the security controls that will reduce the likelihood of serious incidents
occurring'
((ISF IS), SM 3.3, (2005)).
'Area SM 5 Malicious Attack
Organizations are often subject to malicious attack from third parties, for example, by viruses or
hacking. Consequently, this area covers the security controls required to protect against viruses
and othermalicious code, provide intrusion detection capabilities, respond to a serious attack and
manage forensic investigations.
Section SM 5.1 Virus protection
Principle: Virus protection arrangements should be established and maintained enterprise-wide.
Objective: To protect the enterprise against the virus attack and ensure it can respond to virus
infection within critical timescales.
SM 5.1.2 The risk ofvirus infection should be reduced by:
e) Implementing emergency procedures for dealing with virus
incidents'
((ISF IS), SM 5.1,
(2005)).
'Section SM 5.5 Forensic Investigations
Principle: A process should be established for dealingwith incidents that require forensic
investigation.
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Objective: To identify perpetrators ofmalicious acts and preserve sufficient evidence to
prosecute them if required.
SM 5.5.1 A process should be established for dealing with incidents thatmay require forensic
investigations
SM 5.5.2 There should be documented standards/procedures for dealingwith incidents that may
require forensic investigation, which should cover:
a) Immediate preservation of evidence on discovery of an incident
b) Compliance with a published standard or code ofpractice for recovery of admissible
evidence
c) Maintenance of a log of evidence recovered and the investigation processes undertaken
d) The need to seek legal advice where evidence is recovered
e) Notifying staff that actions may be monitored during the investigation
SM 5.5.3 Evidence should be collected:
a) As if criminal prosecution is pending
b) With respect for all
individuals'
privacy and human rights
c) From as many IT sources as possible (e.g. active, temporary and deleted files, email, or
Internet usage, memory cache, and network logs)
d) From asmany non-IT sources as possible (e.g. CCTV, building access logs and eye
witness accounts).
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SM 5.5.4 During an investigation steps should be taken to:
a) Establish and document a chronological sequence of events
b) Log investigative actions
c) Demonstrate that appropriate evidence has been collected, preserved, and that no one
could have tamperedwith it.
d) Secure target computer equipment
e) Analysis evidence in a controlled environment (i.e. using a copy or
'image'
of the
computer media to avoid corruption of the original)
f) Have evidence reviewed by an impartial independent expert to ensure that it meets
legal requirements
g) Ensure that processes used to create and preserve evidence can be repeated by an
independent third party
h) Limit information about an investigation to a few nominated individuals and ensure it
is kept confidential.
SM 5.5.5 All results from the investigation should be reported to seniormanagement and
appropriate legal/regulatory bodies.
'
((ISF IS), SM 5.6, (2005)).
'Section SM 6.7 Outsourcing
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Principle: A process should be established to govern the selection andmanagement ofoutsource
providers supported by documented agreements that specify the security requirements to be met.
Objective: To ensure that security requirements are satisfied and maintained when the running of
a particular environment is entrusted to an outsource provider.
SM 6.7.4 Documented agreements, such as contracts, should be established that oblige outsource
providers to:
b) Provide information about security
incidents'
((ISF IS), SM 6.7, (2005)).
'Section SM 7.2 Securitymonitoring
Principle: The information security condition of the enterprise should be monitored periodically
and reported to top management.
Objective: To provide top management with an accurate, comprehensive and coherent
assessment of the security condition of the enterprise.
SM 7.2.3 Information collected for monitoring purposes should include details about:
f) The pattern and business impact of incidents
g) Individual incidents that have had a sever business impact on the enterprise
SM 7.2.4 Information about security condition of the enterprise should:
g) Help calculate the overall cost of security (i.e. the cost of implementing controls plus
financial of
incidents).'
((ISF IS), SM 7.2, (2005)).
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'Section CB 2.4 Incidentmanagement
Principle: All incidents of any type should be recorded, reviewed, and resolved using an
incident
management process.
Objective: To identify and resolve incidents effectively, minimize their business impact, and
reduce the risk of similar incidents occurring.
CB 2.4.1 All incidents that affect the application (includingmalicious attacks, abuse/misuse of
systems by staff, loss ofpower/communications services and errors by users or computer staff)
should be dealt with in accordance an incident management process
CB 2.4.2 The incident management process should be documented and cover reporting and
recording of incidents, investigation and resolving incidents, reviewing patterns of incidents, and
escalation ofprocesses.
CB 2.4.3 Incidents should be:
a) Reported to a single point of contract, such as a help desk, telephone hot line or
individual IT specialists.
b) Documented, typically using an automated incident management system
c) Categorized by type (e.g. malfunctions, malicious attack of internal abuse/misuse of
systems)
d) Prioritized according to their impact/urgency
CB 2.4.4 The business impact of significant incidents should be assessed by an IT specialist, the
application
'owner'
and an information security specialist.
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CB 2.4.5 The resolution of incidents should include:
a) Investigation their root causes
b) Planning corrective action to ensure security is not affected
c) Restricting access when corrective actions are performed
d) Documenting corrective actions taken
e) Performing a review to ensure that the security of the application has not been affected by
the incident or its resolution.
CB 2.4.6 Patterns of incidents should be reviewed to identify potential security breaches and
minimize chances of similar incidents disrupting the applications or other applications in the
future.'
((ISF IS), CB 2.4, (2005)).
'Section CB 3.4 Security awareness
Principle: Users of the application should be made aware of the key elements of information
security and why it is needed and understand their personal information security responsibilities.
Objective: The ensure users of the application apply security controls and prevent the security of
information used in the application from being compromised
CD 3.4.4 User of the application should be made aware that they are prohibited from:
k) Tampering with evidence in the case of the incidents that may require
investigations.'
'Section CB 5.3 Information risk analysis
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Principle: The application should be subject to a structured information risk analysis on a regular
basis, the results ofwhich should be documented, reviewed, and agreed by the application
'owner'.
Objective: To identify key information risks associatedwith the application and determine the
security controls required in order to keep those risks within acceptable limits.
CB 3.5 The risk analysis process should help organizations to:
a) Select security controls that will reduce the likelihood of serious incidents occurring.
'
((ISF IS), CB 3.4, (2005)).
'Section CB 6. 1 Third party agreements
Principle: Connections from third parties( i.e. external organization, such as customers, suppliers
and members of the public) should be subject to a risk assessment, approved by the application
'owner'
and agreed by both parties in a documented agreement, such as a contract.
Objective: To ensure that only agreed and approved third partied gain access to the application.
CB 6.1 .3 The provision of third party access should be supported by documented agreements,
'signed off by the application 'owner'. Agreements should oblige third parties to complywith
good practice for information security and provide information about security
incidents.'
((ISF
IS), CB 6.1, (2005)).
'CB6.1.4 Third party agreement should include:
b) Arrangements formanaging changes and
incidents'
((ISF IS), CB 6.1, (2005)).
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'Section CI 2.2 Event logging
Principle: Logs of all key events within the computer installation should be maintained
(preferably using automated tools), reviewed periodically and protected and protected against
unauthorized change.
Objective: To ensure individual accountability and to enable incidents, such as access violations,
to be investigated and
resolved.'
((ISF IS), CI 2.2, (2005)).
'Section CI 2.6 Hazard protection
Principle: Computer equipment and facilities should be protected against fire, flood,
environmental, and other natural hazards.
Objective: To prevent services being disrupted by damage to computer equipment facilities.
CI 2.6.4 The impact ofhazards should beminimized by:
a) Located hand-held fire extinguishers so thatminor incidents can be tackled without
delay.'
((ISF IS), CI 2.6, (2005)).
'Area CI 3 System Operation
Achieving service targets require computer installations to be run in accordancewith sound
disciplines. Accordingly this area covers basic controls over system operation (i.e. handling
computermedia, back-up, and change management) and arrangements for identifying and
resolving incidents (i.e. incident
management and emergency
fixes).'
((ISF IS), CI 3.1, (2005)).
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'Section CI 3.4 Incident Management
Principle: All incidents of any type should be recorded, reviewed, and resolved using an incident
management process.
Objective: To identify and resolve incidents effectively, minimize their business impact, and
reduce the risk of similar incidents occurring.
CI 3.4.1 All incidents that affect the installation (including third party attack, internal
misuse/abuse, malfunctions, loss ofpower/communications services, overloads and mistakes by
users or computer staff) should be dealt with in accordance with an incidentmanagement
process.
CI 3.4.2 The incident management process should be documented and cover reporting and
recording of incidents, investigating and resolving incidents, reviewing patterns of incidents and
escalation processes.
CI 3.4.3 Incidents should be:
a) Reported to a single point of contact, such as a help desk, telephone hot line or individual IT
specialist
b) Documented, typically using an automated incidentmanagement system
c) Categorized by type (i.e. malfunctions, malicious attack or internal abuse/misuse of systems)
d) Prioritized according to their impact/urgency.
CI 3.4.4 The business impact of significant incidents should be assessed by an IT specialist, the
'owner'
of an application supported by the installation and an information security specialist.
CI 3.4.5 The resolution of incidents should include:
a) Investigating their root causes
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b) Planning corrective action to ensure security is not affected
c) Restricting access when corrective actions are performed
d) Documenting corrective actions taken
e) Performing a review to ensure that the security of the installation has not been affected by the
incident or its resolution.
CI 3.4.6 Patterns of incidents should be reviewed to identify potential security breaches and
minimize the chances of similar incidents disrupting the installation
- or other installations - in
the
future.'
((ISF IS), CI 3.4, (2005)).
'Section CI 4.1 Access control arrangements
Principle: Access control arrangements should be established to restrict access by al types of
user to approved system capabilities of the computer installation.
Objective: To ensure that only authorized individuals gain access to information or systems
within the computer installation, and that individual accountability is assured.
CI 4.1.4 Access control arrangements should:
g) Upgraded in response to new threats, capabilities, business requirements or experience of
incidents.'
((ISF IS), CI 4.1, (2005)).
'Section CI 5.2 Security awareness
Principle: Staff running the installation should bemade aware of the key elements of
information security and why it is needed, and understand their personal information security
responsibilities.
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CI 5.2.4 Staff employed in the computer installation should be made aware that they are
prohibited from:
j) Tamperingwith evidence in the case of incidents thatmay require forensic
investigation'
((ISF
IS), CI 5.2, (2005)).
'Section CI 5.4 Information risk analysis
Principle: The computer installation should be subject to a structured information risk analysis
on a regular basic the results fwhich should be documented, reviewed, and agreed by the
installation 'owner'.
Objective: To identify key information risk associated with the computer installation and
determine the security controls required in order to keep those risks within acceptable limits.
CI 5.4.6 The risk analysis should help organizations to:
a) Select the security controls thatwill reduce the likelihood of serious incidents
occurring.'
((ISF IS), CI 5.4, (2005)).
'Area NW 3 Network Operations
Maintaining continuity of service ofusers requires computer networks to be run in accordance
with sound disciplines. Accordingly, this area covers the arrangements needed to monitor
network performance and to manage changes and incidents. In addition, the area covers the
arrangements required to provide physical security, take backups and ensure service
continuity.'
((ISF IS), NW 3. 1(2005)).
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'SectionNW 3.3 Incidentmanagement
Principle: All network incidents of any type should be recorded, reviewed, and resolved using
an incidentmanagement process.
Objective: To identify and resolve network incidents effectively, minimize their business impact
and reduce the risk of similar incidents occurring.
NW 3.3.1 All incidents that affect the network (including third party attack, internal
misuse/abuse, malfunctions, loss ofpower/communications services, overloads and mistakes by
users or computer staff) should be dealt with in accordance with an incident management
process.
NW 3.3.2 The incidentmanagement process should be documented and cover reporting and
recording of incidents, investigating and resolving incidents, reviewing patterns of incidents and
escalation processes.
NW 3.3.3 Network incidents should be:
a) Reported to a single point of contact, such as a help desk, telephone hotline or individual IT
specialist
b) Documented, typically using an automated incidentmanagement system
c) Categorized by type (e.g. malfunctions, malicious attack or internal abuse/misuse of
the network)
d) Prioritized according to their impact/urgency.
NW 3.3.4 The business impact of significant network incidents should be assessed by a network
specialist, the network 'owner',
'owners'
of the applications supported by the network and an
information security specialist.
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NW 3.3.5 The resolution ofnetwork incidents should include:
a) Investigating their root causes
b) Planning corrective action to ensure security is not affected
c) Restricting access when corrective actions are performed
d) Documenting corrective actions taken
e) Performing a review to ensure that the security of the network has not been affected by the
incident or its resolution.
NW 3.3.6 Patterns ofnetwork incidents should be reviewed to identify potential security
breaches and minimize the chances of similar incidents disrupting the network
- or other
networks - in the
future.'
((ISF IS), NW 3.3, (2005)).
'SectionNW 4.2 Security Awareness
Principle: Network staff should be made aware of the key elements of information security and
why it is needed and understand their personal information security responsibilities.
Objective: To ensure the network staff apply security controls and prevent the security of
information transmitted across the network from being compromised.
NW 4.2.4 Network staff should be made aware that they are prohibited from:
j) Tampering with evidence in the case of incidents that may require forensic
investigations.'
((ISF IS), NW 4.2, (2005)).
'Section NW 4.4 Information risk analysis
54
Principle: The network should be subject to a structured information risk analysis on a regular
basis, the results ofwhich should be documented, reviewed, and agreed by the network 'owner'.
Objective: To identify key information risks associated with the network and determine the
security controls required in order to keep those risks within acceptable limits.
NW 4.4.6 The risk analysis should help organizations to:




'Section SD 2.2 Security awareness
Principle: Systems development staff should bemade aware of the key elements of information
security and why it is needed, and understands their personal information security
responsibilities.
Objective: To ensure that systems development staff apply security controls and prevent the
security of information used in development activities from being compromised.
SD 2.2.4 Development staff should be made aware that they are prohibited from:
j) Tampering with evidence in the case of incidents thatmay require forensic
investigation'
((ISF
IS), SD 2.2, (2005)).
'Section SD 3.5 Information Risk Analysis
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Principle: Systems under development should be subject to a structured information risk
analysis, the results ofwhich should be documented, reviewed and agreed by the business owner.
Objective: To identify key risks associated with systems under development and determine the
security controls required in order to keep those risks within acceptable limits. ((ISF IS), SD 3.5,
(2005)).
SD 3.5.6 The risk analysis should help organizations to:
a) Select the security controls that will reduce the likelihood of serious incidents
occurring'
'Section SD 6.3 Post-implementation review
Principle: Post-implementation reviews should be conducted for all new systems.
Objective: To check that systems and information security controls function as needed.
SD 6.3.2 Post-implementation reviews should be conducted for all new systems.
c) Security
incidents'
((ISF IS), SD 6.3, (2005)).
The next framework analyzed is The Control Objectives for Information and Related
Technology (COBIT). 'COBIT has been developed as a general accepted standard for good
Information Technology (IT) security and control practices that provides a reference framework
formanagement, users, and IS audit, control, and security practitioners. The COBIT framework
is broken down into four domains: planning and organization (PO), acquire and implement (AI),
deliver and support (DS), andmonitor and evaluate
(ME).'
(www.isaca.org). Within each
domain, are control objectives with detailed control processes. Under the deliver and support
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domain is where incident response high level and low level control objectives and control
processes reside:
'DSlO-Manage Problems and Incidents
Control over the IT process ofmanaging problems and incidents that satisfies the business
requirement to ensure that problems and incidents are resolved, and the cause investigated to
prevent any recurrence is enabled by a problemmanagement system that records and progresses
all incidents and takes into consideration:
Audit trails ofproblems and solutions
Timely resolution ofreported problems
Escalation procedures
Incident reports
Accessibility of configuration information
Supplier responsibilities
Coordination with change management
Control Objective: 1 -10.1. ProblemManagement System
Description: IT management should define and implement a problemmanagement system to
ensure that all operational events that are not part of the standard operation (incidents, problems,
and errors) are recorded, analyzed, and resolved in a timely manner. Emergency program
change procedures should be promptly tested, documented, approved, and reported. Incidents
reports should be established in the case of significant problems.
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Control Practices:
1 . The requirements for a problemmanagement system are identified by the IT
management through consultationwith the business, and a system is implemented
and maintained to ensure that events that are not part of standard operations are
recorded, analyzed, and resolved in a timelymanner.
2. Clear, unambiguous procedures are in place to ensure that there is a standard
method for categorizing, prioritizing, recording, maintaining, andmanaging
different types of incidents and problems. The procedures are clearly
communicated throughout the organization, with the appropriate personnel
receiving training, as required. Procedures are assessed periodically and
enhanced as appropriate.
3. The roles and responsibilities for addressing problems and incidents are defined
and assigned. The required skills for this task are available to the organization
through internal resources and/or external service providers. An incident/problem
manager is responsible formanaging the work of the support staff, monitoring the
efficiency and the effectiveness of the problem management system and
developing andmaintaining the problem management system. The work of the
manager and the support staff is assessed through actual performance being
compared to service level agreements.
4. The problem management system identified appropriate approaches for the timely
addressing of incidents and the analysis ofunderlying causes.
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5. The problem management system is periodically reviewed bymanagement to
identify potential areas of increased effectiveness and efficiency and to ensure
that it continues to meet business requirements.
6. The problem management system provides for a clear, predefined classification of
problems and incidents, so consideration ofpriorities and problem areas can be
determine in a structured way.
7. The problem management system provides for an incident report procedures for
critical events and communication to the affected users.
8. The problem management system is in line with the other IT processes, especially
for AI6 Manage Changes, DS9 Manage the Configuration, and DS13
Management Operations.
Control Objective 2- 10.2. Problem Escalation
Description: ITManagement should define and implement problem escalation procedures to
ensure that identified problems are solved in the most efficient way on a timely basis. These
procedures should ensure that these priorities are appropriately set. The procedures should also
document the escalation process for the activation of the IT continuity plan.
Control Practices:
1 . Appropriate escalation procedures are defined and implemented by IT management
through consultation with business units, including consideration of the role of
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external service providers. The authorizations, roles, and responsibilities for
escalating problems are clearly defined and assigned.
2. There is a coding system for categorization, based on the type ofproblem incident
(i.e. server orworkstation) to facilitate identification of the possible cause and the
assignment of support staff to the problem. The priority of a problem or incident is
based on the impact of the problem on the business (i.e. number of roles of affected
users) and the urgency to the business with which a resolution is needed.
3. Procedures are in place to ensure a correct allocation of staff and resources to manage
incidents and programs according to their classification and prioritization.
4. Procedures are in place for hierarchical escalation, ifmore effort or resources are
needed, and for functional escalation, ifother expertise is needed. For functional
escalation, incidents are dispatched from first line (service desk) to second line (IT
specialist) and, if applicable, to third line (external specialists and suppliers). The
procedures include actions to be taken for problems that remain open for a long time,
including escalation and rerouting.
5. Standard forms and work instruction are available for frequent incidents so they can
be solved in an efficient and standardized way (i.e. password resets).
6. The problem escalation process is communicatedwidely to ensure all appropriate
parties understand it. Communication protocols support the timely notification of
problems to all affected users.
7. IT management is notified of a high-impact incident, i.e., the impact on users is
extreme or disruption can be excessive. The IT manager arranges a formal meeting
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with all parties involved (key support staff, vendor support staff, business
management, etc) to determine the best course of action.
8. Action and decisionmade during escalation are recorded in the problem management
system. The configuration management database (CMDB) is accessible to assist in
analyzing and diagnosing cause and to determine the impact and urgency of a
problem or incident.
9. The problem escalation process is periodically reviewed bymanagement or skilled
auditors to identify potential areas for increased effective ness and efficiency and to
ensure that the process still meets business requirements.
Control Objective: 3- 10.3 Problem Tracking and Audit Trail
Description: The problem management system should provide for adequate audit trail facilities
that allow tracking from incident to underlying cause (i.e. package release or urgent change
implementation) and back. It should work closely with changemanagement, availability
management, and configuration management.
Control Practices
1 . All reported problems and incidents are recorded in an automated tool (application)
with information captured including, but not limited to, type (i.e. hardware, software)
status (i.e. new, assigned, escalated, closed) and the incident/problem owner.
2. Support staff reacts only to incident and problems that are notified to them through
agreed channels.
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3. Details of closed problems or incidents are recorded in the organization's problem
management system.
4. Sufficient staff and resources are available to prevent handling of the underlying
problems taking second place to ad hoc incident handling.
5. The status of a problem or incident is reported to the affected users. Involved support
personnel can access relevant information in the problem management system on a
need-to-know basis.
6. A history ofproblem ticketmodification is available, i.e. status change, priority
change, time spent on escalation.
7. The problem management application is capable of appropriate statistics and trends
reporting for senior management.
8. Support contracts and service level agreements are in place with vendors to ensure
appropriate input to the problem tracking and resolution process.
9. Fault detectionmechanisms are implemented on systems and network components for
automatic incident logging and alerting.
10. Diagnostic tools are available for effectively diagnosing the cause of the problem or
incident.
Control Objective: 4- 10.4. Emergency and TemporaryAccess Authorizations
Description: Emergency and temporary access authorizations should be documented on standard
forms and maintained on file, approved by appropriate managers, securely communicated to the
security function and automatically terminated after a predetermined period.
Control Practices:
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1 . The procedures for emergency and temporary access authorization are clearly
defined, properly documented, supported, and approved bymanagement.
2. The responsibility for approval of emergency and temporary access authorizations is
clearly defined, properly documented, and supported bymanagement.
3. Automatic detailed logging and authorization changes, including start/finish times
and actions taken, are implemented and subject to regular independent reviews.
4. Emergency and temporary access authorization are monitored for accuracy and
effectiveness, reported to and analyzed by the security function and appropriate
management, and regularly updated with the results from the analysis.
5. Mechanisms are in place to automatically remove emergency and temporary access
authorizations immediately after the associated problem is solved.
6. The emergency and temporary access authorization matrix (roles and responsibilities
chart) is updated for personnel changes.
Control Objective: 5- 10.5. Emergency Processing Priorities
Description: Emergency processing priorities should be established, documented, and approved
by appropriate program and IT management.
Control Practices:
1 . Priority resolution criteria are defined to achieve the proper attention to emergency
processing requirements. Priority criteria are documented and approved.
2. Simple and easy-to-use procedures and standard forms are available for quick and
effective response to emergency incidents.
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3. Required support staff, including specialists andmanagement, has been identified and
procedures established to ensure that staff is available in case of an emergency
incident.
4. Actions taken to manage emergency incidents are manually documented in the
problem management system is not readily available, with retrospective updating of
the system at the earliest opportunity.
Themanagement of emergency incidents is reviewed and evaluated, and lesson learned are used
to improve the emergency response
procedures.'
((COBIT), DS10, (2005)).
'DS5- Ensure Systems Security
Control over the IT process of ensuring systems security that satisfies the business requirement
to safeguard information against unauthorized use, disclosure ormodification, damage or loss
is enabled by logical access controls that ensure that access to systems, data and programs is
restricted to authorized users and takes into consideration:
Confidentiality and privacy requirements
Authorization, authentication and access control
User identification and authorization profiles
Need-to-have and need-to-know
Cryptographic keymanagement
Incident handling, reporting and follow-up





Tools for monitoring compliance, intrusion testing and reporting
Control Objective 6-5.11 Incident Handling
Description: Management should establish a computer security incident handling capability to
address security incidents by providing a centralized platformwith sufficient expertise and
equipped with rapid and secure communication facilities. Incidentmanagement responsibilities
and procedures should be established to ensure an appropriate, effective and timely response to
security incidents.
Control Practices:
1 . Reported security incidents (breaches) are reviewed promptly by a central team with
sufficient expertise to minimize damage and find/eliminate the root cause for the security
breach.
2. Management is informed of all significant security breaches.
3. There is an adequately communicated formal disciplinary process for employees who are
found to have violated organizational security policies and procedures; employees and
contractors are made aware of this
process.'
((COBIT), DS5, (2005)).
'COSO is a private sector initiative established in 1985 by five financial professional
associations. COSO's goal is to improve the quality of financial reporting through a focus on
corporate governance, ethical practices, and internal
control'
(http://www.coso.org). COSO is a
popular framework that corresponds/maps to the COBIT framework. The two frameworks do
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not map 100%, but, they are the most acceptable frameworks used in the commercial sector, so
the mapping that does exist, is used on a frequent basis. The COSO framework is divided into
five domains: Control Environment, Risk Assessment, Control Activities, Information and,
Communications, andMonitoring. 'The first domain, Control Environment, creates the
foundation for effective internal control, establishes the "tone at the
top"
and represents the apex
of the corporate governance structure. The issues raised in the control environment component
apply throughout an organization. The second domain, Risk Assessment, involves the
identification and analysis bymanagement ofrelevant risks to achieve predetermined objectives,
which form the basis for determining control activities. It is likely that internal control risks
could be more pervasive in the IT organization than in other areas of the organization. Risk
Assessment may occur at the company level (for the overall organization) or at the activity level
(for a specific process or business unit). The Control Environment primarily addresses the
company level. The third domain, Control Activities, are the policies, procedures and practices
that are put into place to ensure that business objectives are achieved and riskmitigation
strategies are carried out. Control Activities are developed to specifically address each control
objective to mitigate the risks identified. COSO states that information is needed at all levels of
an organization to run the business and achieve the entity's control objectives. However, the
identification, management and communication of relevant information represent an ever-
increasing challenge to the IT department. The determination ofwhich information is required to
achieve control objectives, and the communication of this information in a form and time frame
that allow people to carry out their duties, support the other four components of the COSO
framework. The last domain, Monitoring, which covers the oversight of internal control by
management through continuous and point-in-time assessment processes, is becoming
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increasingly important to IT
management.'
(www.itgi.org). There are two types ofmonitoring
activities: continuous monitoring and separate evaluations. From the above incident
response/forensic COBIT mappings, the following COSO domains map accordingly:
COBIT Control Objectives COSO Domains
DSlO-Manage Problems and Incidents Control Activities, Information and
Communication, andMonitoring
Control Objective: 1 -10.1. Problem
Management System
Control Activities, Information and
Communication, andMonitoring
Control Objective 2-10.2. Problem Escalation Control Activities, Information and
Communication, andMonitoring
Control Objective: 3- 10.3 Problem Tracking
and Audit Trail
Control Activities, Information and
Communication, andMonitoring
Control Objective: 4- 10.4. Emergency and
TemporaryAccess Authorizations
Control Activities, Information and
Communication, andMonitoring




Control Objective 6-5.11- Incident Handling Control Activities, Information and
Communication, andMonitoring
The last guidance researched for this matrix is the Payment Card Industry requirements. With
the every increasing rise of identify theft, the credit card industry have created their own set of
security requirements. 'The new Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard outlines
best practices for credit card data that is stored, processed, or transmitted. It consolidates and
supersedes the requirements of the previously developed MasterCard Site Data Protection (SDP)
Program and the Visa Cardholder Information Security Program (CISP). As such, the new
standard contains IT security requirements and guidelines for all major credit card issuers,
including Visa, MasterCard, American Express, Diners Club and Discover. These card issuers
joined forces to develop the new requirements as part of an industry-wide standard for protection
of
cardholders'
credit card account and transaction
information.' ('Columbitech'
2005).
'Maintain an Information Security
12.9 Implement an incident response plan. Be prepared to respond immediately to a system
breach.
12.9. 1 Create an incident response plan to be used in the event of system compromise. Ensure
the plan addresses, at aminimum, specific response procedures, business recovery and continuity
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procedures, data backup processes, roles and responsibilities, and communication and contact
strategies (i.e. informing Acquirers and credit card associations).
12.9.2 Test the plan at least annually.
12.9.3 Designate specific personnel to be available on a 24/7 basis to respond to compromise
alerts.
12.9.4 Provide appropriate framing to staffwith security breach response responsibilities.
12.9.5 Include alerts from intrusion, detection, intrusion prevention, and file integritymonitoring
systems.
12.9.6 Have a process to modify and evolve the incident response plan according to lessons
learned to incorporate industry
developments.'
(PCI, pages 50-51).
Now that the relevant requirements have been identified, a common languagemust be
created in order to map the regulations, standards, frameworks, guidances, and requirements
effectively. The tables below note the common language requirements and the detailed
mappings.
Incident response /computer FFIEC ISO SOX HIPAA GLBA
forensic/privacy requirements 17799:2005
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Figure 1 Detailed mapping to standards and regulations






1 . Incident response and X DS10.1, CA, P14 12.9.1, SM5.5,
computer forensics definitions DS10.2, IC,M 12.9.6 CB2.4.1 and
are documented in the DS CB2.4,
Information Security (IS) Policy, 10.3,
CI3.4 and





2. The IS Policy should be X DS10.1, CA, 12.9.1, SM5.5,









3. Organizations should keep X DS10.1, CA, P14 12.9.1 CB2.4.2
open communication with DS10.5 IC,M
external security entities (i.e.,
LE, special interest groups, and
customers') when an incident
occurs.
4. Incident response/forensic X DS10.5 CA, P14 12.9.1 SM5.5,
activities should be multi- IC,M CB2.4.1 and





5. All security requirements X DS10.1, CA, P14 12.9.6 CB12.2,
should be documented, DS10.4 IC,M CB2.4.3,
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monitored, and reviewed before
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9. Reporting of security breaches X DS10.1, CA, P14 12.9.1 CI3.4,
should be documented and DS10.2 IC,M NW3.3,
channeled throughmanagement. CB2.4, and
SM5.5
10. All roles and responsibilities X DS10.1, CA, P14 12.9.3 CD.4,
are defined and documented in DS10.2 IC,M NW3.3,
regards to incident CB2.4, and
response/investigations/forensics. SM5.5
1 1 . Evidence collection, X DS10.2 CA, P14 12.9.1, SM5.5.2 and
traceability, testing, preservation, IC,M 12.9.2, SM5.5.3
and retention should be 12.9.5
documented and follow the legal
statues in place. Evidence
collection, testing, backups, etc
should be documented in a
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consider the possibility of
insurance in regards to security
breaches, etc.
15. Media disposal (after the
fact) should be consistent and
disposed ofonly after the
designated timeframe.
CI3, SM5.5.4
Figure 2 Detailed mappings to frameworks, guidances, and requirements
Now that the requirements have been identified andmapped, a high level policy can be
created that should give organizations the confidence that the common language requirements
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created sufficientlymap to existing regulations, standards, frameworks, and guidances. Not only
can organizations pass the mandatory audits for certain regulations, but also, their policies,
processes, and procedures will help them when creating, documenting, and possibly prosecuting
an incident.
COMPANY ABC Incident Response/Forensic Policy; version 1
Purpose and objectives of the policy: To create a repeatable, effective incident response/forensic
policy that maps to regulations, standards, and frameworks as well as to the organization's
Standard Operating Procedures (SOP's) and processes.
Scope of the policy (to whom and what it applies and underwhat circumstances): This policy
applies to all individuals under the Information Security, ThreatManagement, Compliance,
Legal, Corporate Security, and Ethic Departments.
Definition ofcomputer security incidents and their consequences within the context of the
organization: A computer security incident will be classified by performing a risk assessment on
the suspect activity or a reported claim of fraudulent activity. Dependent on the classification of
the incident, the extent of the damage or liability, as well as previous documented incidents by
the same individual or organization will determine the level of action taken.
Defined incident response/forensic requirements:
Requirement/Policy statements: Incident response and computer forensics definitions are
documented in the Information Security (IS) Policy, SOP's, internal controls, etc. This Policy
should be reviewed whenever the organizations infrastructure/environment changes.
Requirement/Policy statements: Each incident should be evaluated (risk assessment) when
contemplating its vulnerable to the organization.
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Requirement/Policy statements: All roles and responsibilities are defined and documented in
regards to incident response/investigations/forensics. Each incident should be evaluated (risk
assessment) when contemplating its vulnerable to the organization. Reporting of security
breaches should be documented and channeled throughmanagement. Organization should
consider the possibility of insurance in regards to security breaches, etc.
Requirement/Policy Statements: Organizations should keep open communicationwith external
security entities (i.e., LE, special interest groups). Incident response/forensic activities should be
multi-disciplinary, with cooperation throughout the organization. All security requirements
should be documented, monitored, and reviewed before granting access to external entities, third
parties, and/or contractors. Legal requirements and consequences, including incident/forensic
definitions, should be taken into account when logging andmonitoring pertinent information for
investigations/forensics. Evidence collection, traceability, testing, preservation, and retention
should be documented and followed the legal statues in place. Evidence collection, testing,
backups, etc should be documented in a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and Disaster Recovery
Plan (DRP) as well. Only relevant/pertinent access should be granted to external entities when
helpingwith an incident/forensics. Media disposal (after the fact) should be consistent and
disposed ofonly after the designated timeframe.
Incident Response/Forensics Steps to Evidence Collection/Analysis/Retention: Physical Security
Requirement/Policy Statements Requirement/Policy Statements: Physical securitymust be taken
into account not only to detect an incident but also
to safeguard forensic evidence.
Security Awareness and Training: Requirement/Policy Statement: Security awareness and
training/lessons learned are necessary for the entire organization and not only formembers of the
investigative/forensic process.
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In conclusion, this proposed thesis has demonstrated that a high-level incident
response/forensic policy should startwith an understanding of the current regulations, standards,
and frameworks relevant to the organization's vertical. In addition, commonalities between such
regulations, standards, and frameworks should be analyzed and condensed to create a common
language that can be used to create a high level policy that will uphold during an assessment
and/or audit for compliance.
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